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H I G H L I G H T S

While western power representatives in Washington continued during the past week their attempt to reach agreement on the key issues of the German problem, the USSR maintained an energetic propaganda campaign in Germany against the establishment of a west German government. In pursuit of this campaign, Soviet propagandists are attempting to capitalize upon the German fear of Soviet aggression, the desire for national unity, and the present dissatisfaction with political conditions in the western zones (see page 2). Meanwhile, morale among western German politicians engaged in drafting a constitution for a west German state is low and it is unlikely that much progress will be made until after publication of the occupation statute now being drafted by the western powers (see page 3).

Strong guerrilla pressure is apparently developing again in the Grammos area on the Albanian frontier, the scene of the bitter guerrilla fighting in 1948 (see page 5). Recent reports of heavy fighting in the Grammos mountains apparently point primarily to a guerrilla attempt to regain a strong foothold convenient to Albanian supply bases. The campaigns of the Greek National forces in the Peloponnesus and central Greece have been effective locally in those areas but have not affected guerrilla capabilities in areas convenient to Albania and Bulgaria.

With the recent conclusion of an Israeli-Transjordan military agreement, the military situation in Palestine appears to have been virtually stabilized for the present (see page 7). The reaching of an armistice agreement with Syria still looks to be an early possibility, despite the recent attempt of the Israelis to seize Syrian territory and present the Arabs with another fait accompli.

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WESTERN EUROPE

Italian Colonies As the UN delegates prepare to discuss the Italian colonies question, sentiment is growing for some form of multilateral trusteeship for Libya, or at least for Tripolitania. Argentina has suggested such a solution for Tripolitania as an alternative to Italian trusteeship; the Arab states reportedly favor a British-Italian-Egyptian trusteeship for all Libya. Some such compromise solution, which would allow the participation of Italy and an Arab state and yet partly meet the local population's objections to exclusive Italian control, would have substantial appeal to the UN delegates. Supporters in the UN of Italian claims, such as the Latin American states, may insist that any multilateral trusteeship cover all Libya, thus endangering British designs for a UK trusteeship over Cyrenaica.

GERMANY

As western power representatives continue their attempts to reach agreement on the over-all German problem, Soviet propaganda in Germany is still directed primarily at preventing the establishment of a west German government. More important factors than Soviet propaganda in delaying establishment of the west German state, however, are continued western disunity and consequent German demoralization, as well as the German desire for a centralized government.

Soviet Tactics In its attempt to prevent the formation of a west German state, the USSR is conducting a concerted propaganda campaign designed to capitalize on the German fear of Soviet aggression, desire for national unity, and dissatisfaction with political conditions in the western zones. In pursuing this campaign, Soviet propaganda is

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energetically supporting: (1) the Semenov Plan, which proposes that the occupation powers withdraw to a peripheral area; (2) the Nauheim Circle proposals visualizing Germany as a neutral middle ground between East and West; (3) the efforts of east zone politicians, such as Nuschke and Nadolny, to restore German unity; and (4) the Soviet Zone's "all-German" constitution. Anticipating that formation of a west German government cannot be prevented, however, the Kremlin is continuing its preparations for the establishment of an east German state claiming sovereignty over all Germany. Such a state will probably not be brought into being, however, until a west German government appears imminent or is established.

Bonn Council Meanwhile, western German politicians at Bonn--drafting a constitution for the west German state--are marking time. Morale is low, and it is unlikely that much progress will be made until after publication of the occupation statute now being drafted by the US, the UK, and France. The Germans are annoyed that certain parts of the draft constitution finally agreed upon after months of tortuous negotiation have been turned down by the occupying powers on the grounds that these provisions conflict with the 1948 London Conference restrictions on a centralized German government. Specifically, the occupying powers object to those provisions which: (1) give the Cabinet authority to issue emergency decrees; (2) provide for federal control of finance; and (3) allow civil servants to run for office. Any compromise on these differences is unlikely until after publication of the occupation statute and will be difficult even then in view of the reluctance of German politicans to expose themselves to charges of collaboration with the occupation authorities.

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EASTERN EUROPE

SOVIET UNION

Politburo Maneuvers Continuing political maneuvers on the highest level of the Soviet Government are revealed by recent indications that Nicolai Voznesensky, recently deposed chairman of the State Planning Commission, has apparently also been ousted from his Politburo membership. Voznesensky's failure to be appointed, as were the other Politburo members, an honorary delegate to several recent conferences, points to his probable dismissal from the top government body, the only such removal in the last decade. Voznesensky's relationship to the late Andrei Zhdanov strongly suggests that these latest developments are a reflection of the rise of Malenkov following Zhdanov's death.

YUGOSLAVIA

Guerrilla Moves Recent Yugoslav denunciations of subversive efforts by Cominform agents along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border may indicate that guerrilla forays against Tito have already begun. The Yugoslav Government claims to have prevented Cominform Yugoslavs in Bulgaria from establishing contact with units in Yugoslavia. At the same time, Tito's Government has suspended an agreement with Bulgaria which permitted militiamen of either nation to escort trains across the common frontier. Although Tito appears to be in control of the situation, the Cominform will probably increase its efforts to harass the Yugoslavs through subversive and guerrilla action.

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BULGARIA

Communist Deviation The arrest of Traicho Kostov, vice premier and second most important Communist leader in Bulgaria, along with several other leaders in the Government and Party, indicates that the Kremlin has not yet been able to obtain the complete loyalty of the Satellite Communists. These arrests underscore the seriousness of the Kremlin's problem and the strength of Tito-like nationalism; they occurred in a Satellite often used by the Kremlin as an example for the other Satellites. Moreover, Kostov has generally been regarded as absolutely loyal to Moscow. The official communique describing his expulsion charged that Kostov: (1) lacked sincerity in his dealings with Soviet representatives (he apparently resisted economic exploitation of Bulgaria by the USSR); (2) disregarded Party and Government directives; (3) promoted distrust and suspicion within the Bulgarian Communist Party; and (4) opposed the Bulgarian Politburo. Apparently Kostov's cardinal sin was his effort as chairman of the Committee for Economic and Financial Questions to oppose Soviet exploitation of the Bulgarian economy. Although it is not known to what extent Kostov and those arrested with him had succeeded in forming an anti-Cominform organization, the recent denunciation by Interior Minister Yugov of the tendency of nationalist deviationists to form sects suggests that at least a loose kind of grouping was developing.

GREECE

Guerrilla Pressure Strong guerrilla pressure is developing again in the Grammos area on the Albanian frontier, scene of bitter fighting in 1948. Although the guerrilla plan of attack has not yet fully unfolded, the main initial thrust

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is apparently being made from Albania into the southwestern part of the Grammos area, with heavy fighting reported as much as 15 miles inside the Greek frontier. Apparently the guerrillas are attempting to: (1) regain a strong foothold in the Grammos region, convenient to Albanian supply bases; (2) maintain communication routes to central Greece; and (3) disrupt the Greek National Army's offensive plans. Although the Greek National forces during the past month successfully terminated its major campaign in the Peloponnesus and inflicted hundreds of casualties on guerrilla units in central Greece and east-central Macedonia, the effect of the successes has been primarily local. Thus, despite increasing guerrilla recruiting and supply difficulties in the interior of Greece, the guerrillas are still capable of making determined efforts in areas within reach of communication routes across the Albanian and, possibly, Bulgarian frontiers.

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

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

PALESTINE

Military Stabilization Despite Israel's foray across the Syrian frontier early this week, the military situation in Palestine appears virtually stabilized. In little more than a month's time, Israel has concluded armistices with Egypt, Lebanon,and, most recently, Transjordan, while two other Arab states, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have withdrawn from the field. Moreover, the outlook for an early armistice with Syria remains favorable, despite Israel's apparently abortive attempt to apply once more the formula it has followed in all of the previous crucial negotiations. In each case, Israel swiftly seized a key area, confronted the Arabs with a fait accompli, and issued a blunt threat of further attacks on remaining Arab-held territory unless the Arabs promptly acquiesced. Egypt and Transjordan, faced with clear-cut Israeli military superiority and painfully aware that they could rely on neither the UN nor the Big Powers, were forced to yield. The military line resulting from these armistice agreements, which will probably determine in large measure the ultimate frontier, leaves Israel in firm control of most of Palestine.

Transjordan Agreement Under the recent agreement, Transjordan has retained control over the Jenin-Nablus-Tulkarm triangle in central Samaria. In return, Transjordan has assured the Israelis uninterrupted use of the main Haifa-Tel Aviv communication lines (hitherto partially under Iraqi control) by conceding the Afule-Hadera road and the road and railway between Tulkarm and Qalqilya. The Israelis have agreed to leave the Arab villages involved in these changes under Arab control and to make financial compensation to Transjordan for Israeli communication gains.

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PALESTINE

Israel agreed to withdraw from several Arab villages in the Hebron area, most of which had been occupied during the armistice negotiations by Israeli forces. Remaining provisions of the armistice are concerned chiefly with Jerusalem and its approaches. The Arabs may now use the main road from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, and the Jews the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway skirting the Arab-held Latrun salient. The Jews are also assured access to religious places in the Old City as well as the Jewish holdings on Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives. The provision that all questions relating to the Jerusalem area are to be determined by a "special committee" of Israeli and Transjordan representatives may lead to a division of the area into spheres of control in disregard of the UN recommendation for the internationalization of Jerusalem.

Permanent Peace The next round in the Palestine controversy will most likely be negotiations under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to convert the armistices into a permanent peace settlement. In this phase the PCC is certain to run into serious snags over three major issues: (1) provision for the Arab refugees; (2) the status of Jerusalem; and (3) final delimitation of frontiers. The critical factor in all three cases will be the extent of Israeli willingness to compromise. Although the US has repeatedly stressed the necessity of concessions by Israel, the Israelis, flushed with victory, are unlikely to yield on any of these points unless subjected to strong pressure. They will refuse to permit more than a token number of Arabs to return to Israel. They will cling tenaciously to New Jerusalem, to which they plan to move several ministries and which they regard as the spiritual capital of Jewry. Finally, determined to retain areas won by conquest, they are prepared to make at the most only slight territorial concessions.

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IRAN

War of Nerves The stepped-up Soviet war-of-nerves against Iran has produced a new border incident in Azerbaijan. A Soviet regiment reinforced by tanks and armored cars reportedly engaged in an overnight battle with Iranian frontier forces. This engagement, which began on 31 March, was preceded by a new round of alarmist reports of increased Soviet activity along the Azerbaijan frontier. According to these reports, Soviet border posts have been heavily reinforced; maneuvers have been held within sight of Iranian border posts; four Soviet generals have arrived in Baku; and oil and railroad equipment shipments in the Caucasus region have been trebled. These reports have aroused no particular concern on the part of the Iranian Army; together with this latest border skirmish, they probably represent a continuation of the war-of-nerves against Iran rather than preparations for an immediate invasion.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

Kashmir Problems Negotiations for a Kashmir truce agreement, as distinct from the present cease-fire, are being protracted by the extreme positions which both India and Pakistan have adopted, presumably for bargaining purposes. As a result, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, which has thus far considered attainment of a truce to be a matter for direct negotiation between the two governments, may soon have to take the initiative and furnish each government with a precise interpretation of its obligations regarding a truce. Meanwhile, the repatriation of refugees is the first basic problem requiring solution. The return to Kashmir of all refugees who desire to do so--specifically called for by the UN Commission's proposals of 11 December 1948--must precede a plebiscite if the voting is to reflect the sentiment of the Kashmir

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population. Several months will probably be required to solve this complex problem. The next major task will be to prepare satisfactory electoral rolls and to assure proper conditions for a fair plebiscite. Because these preparations cannot be completed before winter (when a plebiscite is considered impossible) the plebiscite will probably not take place until April or May of 1950.

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FAR EAST

CHINA

Peace Talks The weak and divided Nationalist Peace Delegation in Peiping provides the Communists with a perfect foil for exercising control over the course of negotiations. Lacking political cohesion and authority, the delegation will probably refer all major issues to Nanking for decision. Meanwhile, both the Communist Party and the Kuomintang are taking additional steps to influence the course of the peace negotiations. Meeting recently in Canton under Sun Fo's chairmanship, members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the Central Political Council adopted conditions for "an honorable peace" which are incompatible with the announced Communist demands. These Kuomintang leaders may be attempting to exercise the traditional power of the Kuomintang over government policy and to establish Nationalist peace terms entirely unacceptable to the Communists. For their part, the Communists have applied increased pressure against Li's government. In an indirect "ultimatum," the Communists indicated that they would cross the Yangtze if Li himself did not come to Peiping or send a high-ranking Nationalist official to assist in drawing up a plan before 12 April for the reorganization of the Nationalist Army. The Communists are fully capable of carrying out this threat, but they are unlikely to assume the resulting blame for having broken off the peace negotiations at this time.

Nationalist Prisoners Interrogation of returned Nationalist soldiers indicates that the Chinese Communist armies have thus far absorbed more than half of the approximately one million Nationalist troops who were taken over by the Communists during the past six months. The Communists have retained about 400,000 captured Nationalists

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CHINA

as individual replacements and service troops and about 210,000 more "politically mature" Nationalists for use in combat units. The past Communist pattern for dealing with such troops has been: (1) to separate officers above the grade of regimental commander (colonel) from their units; (2) to inform technicians that they must serve with the forces of liberation; (3) to disperse Nationalist combat soldiers throughout various Communist assault units; and (4) to give the remainder (the majority) their choice of staying with the Communists or returning to the Nationalist areas following a period of Communist indoctrination. So long as food and clothing are available, the Communists will probably be able to integrate into their own order of battle up to 60% of the captured Nationalists and about 90% of the voluntary turncoats.

INDONESIA

Batavia Talks The UN-sponsored talks scheduled to begin soon at Batavia between the Dutch and the Republicans may bog down over one phase of an issue which has consistently been a basic point of disagreement between the disputants: control of military forces. The meeting is being called to discuss the practical details involved in implementation of the 28 January Security Council resolution and to pave the way for the Dutch-proposed conference at The Hague. The Dutch will probably maintain that the establishment of Republican civil authority at Jogjakarta will be sufficient compliance with the SC resolution concerning Republican restoration and that Dutch forces, or a Dutch-sponsored federal army, must retain responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Republicans will demand restoration

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INDONESIA

of military, as well as civil, authority. Unless the Dutch allow Republican military forces to return to Jogjakarta, it is unlikely that the Republicans will: (1) agree to attend the conference at The Hague; and (2) be able to obtain the popular support necessary for effective compliance throughout Indonesia with a cease-fire order.

MALAYA

Security Campaign Although British anti-terrorist operations in Malaya are increasingly successful and production of rubber and tin is being maintained, the cost of the security campaign promises to become prohibitive in the near future for the Federation of Malaya. Apparently in anticipation of the insolvency of the Federation, the UK announced last week that, in addition to its contribution to the present campaign, it plans to give a further 5 million pounds. Although several high Malayan officials expressed regret over the size of the gift, they will probably accept it and hope for increased grants later in the year when Britain has promised to re-examine the needs of the Federation. In view of the importance of Malaya's dollar-earning capacity to Britain's economic program, the UK will probably find it necessary to provide additional funds to the Federation.

BURMA

Karen Surrender Although the Karen "surrender" in Burma is an encouraging development, a final settlement is by no means assured and will come only after prolonged and delicate negotiations. At the moment, the Karen

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BURMA

surrender probably amounts to little more than a cease-fire agreement and may be limited to the Insein area 10 miles north of Rangoon where government troops have surrounded Karens for the past two months. The Karens--with the possible exception of those at Insein where the Government is likely to insist upon full disarming to support its claims of "complete Karen surrender"--will probably retain their arms and insist upon early fulfillment of Premier Thakin Nu's promise to create an autonomous Karen state. The success of the negotiations will depend in large part upon Thakin Nu's retention in office and tacit support for him from the US or UK. The insurgent Communists and the White Peoples Volunteer Organization will oppose any settlement between the Karens and the Government. Furthermore, Burmans in general will not approve of far-reaching concessions to the Karens, and sporadic Karen-Burman violence will probably continue. If a settlement is reached, however, it will increase the ability of Thakin Nu's government to deal with other dissident elements within Burma.

KOREA

Troop Withdrawal The question of the withdrawal of occupation troops from Korea is receiving increased attention in Korean political circles. The UN Committee on Korea is initiating a study on troop withdrawal problems and will probably recommend, within the next month or two, that US troops be withdrawn. Although President Rhee has opposed such a withdrawal until his own forces were capable of maintaining internal security, he is unlikely to oppose the UN committee's recommendation openly. Instead, Rhee will probably increase his pressure upon the US for additional arms and equipment with which to expand the South Korean security forces.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CANADA

Newfoundland's Status Newfoundland's new status as a tenth province of Canada, although necessarily creating immediate economic and political problems requiring adjustment, should in the long run prove mutually advantageous. Newfoundland will gain economically through: (1) lower prices for Canadian goods; (2) increased social welfare benefits; and (3) greater utilization of resources and public service facilities. On the debit side, however, Newfoundland now faces a revision of its taxation system and will lose its major source of revenue, the customs tariff. Canada, too, will find the union expensive because of the large subsidies and grants promised to Newfoundland, the assumption of Newfoundland's $63 million sterling debt, and the cost of administering welfare services. More than offsetting these disadvantages, however, will be the benefits accruing to Canada from: (1) the untapped iron ore resources of Labrador; (2) Newfoundland's valuable pulp and paper industries, minerals, and fisheries; and (3) US dollars obtained from Newfoundland trade with the US and from US military and air bases maintained in that country.

PERU

Colombian Dispute Solution of the dispute between Peru and Colombia over the disposition of APRA leader Haya de la Torre now appears probable without loss of face to either country. Peru has indicated agreement to Colombia's proposal to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice and has suggested immediate conversations with Colombia in order to prepare the case for presentation to the Court.

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WORLD LABOR MOVEMENT

The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), anxious to obtain western representation following the withdrawal of US, British, and Dutch national labor organizations, will attempt to assimilate left-wing unions in these countries on an industry-wide rather than a national basis. WFTU Communist leaders are rushing plans to create trade departments, comprising industrial workers from all parts of the world, and will attempt to bring individual industrial unions (such as British miners and CIO food and agricultural workers) into the Federation regardless of whether their respective international unions are members. By such tactics, the WFTU hopes to absorb, before the second WFTU World Congress in June, substantial numbers of US and western European workers in the mining, metal, textile, agricultural, and leather industries. Later, the WFTU plans to organize other trade departments, beginning with the transport and maritime workers. US and British labor unions accepting such affiliation will face expulsion from their national organizations.

Meanwhile, the drive for early establishment of a new western-oriented world labor organization has been given fresh momentum by the Belgian Trade Union Federation's call for a secret meeting in Brussels of the labor organizations of nine smaller European countries. This move probably reflects: (1) the determination of labor in these countries (Benelux, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland, and Ireland) to take the initiative in planning a new international; (2) impatience with the hesitant leadership of the British Trade Unions Congress, which has been reluctant to act until the problems of US labor cooperation have been solved; and (3) the desire of the smaller national labor organizations, particularly the Belgian, to avoid big-power domination in any new international. This development will probably not be welcomed by the British and Dutch, who currently hold the key positions in the ECA Trade Union Advisory Committee. However, Belgian labor leaders are likely to push the small nation conference, with or without big-power support.

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